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Chairman Shimkus, Ranking Member Tonko, and members of the Committee: Thank you for the 
opportunity to participate in today’s hearing.   
 
My testimony focuses on the purpose and operation of Renewable Identification Numbers, 
better known as RINs, as the compliance mechanism for meeting the Renewable Fuel Standard 
(RFS) mandates.   In particular, my remarks emphasize RINs' accounting and economic role under 
the RFS, as well as summarize the empirical evidence on RIN price determinants and their impact 
on downstream fuel prices. I also address the potential effects of certain proposed changes to 
the RFS on RIN prices, and their implications for future biofuel use in the United States. 
 
 My testimony can be summarized as follows: 
• First, RINs serve a vital accounting role in RFS compliance.  However, their economic role is 
even more critical.  RIN prices adjust to ensure that Congressional biofuel blending mandates 
are met. High RIN prices effectively tax gasoline and diesel, discouraging their use, and 
subsidize biofuels, stimulating their demand.  
• Second, several features of RIN markets suggest that they are efficient.  Prices adjust quickly 
to changing compliance cost expectations, and most RIN price volatility since 2013 can be 
attributed to ever-changing blending targets and uncertainty regarding future mandate 
volumes. However, publicly available data is insufficient to determine whether the market is 
fully efficient or free of manipulation.  Greater transparency would allow researchers and 
regulators to study these issues.  Further, transparency would make attempts to manipulate 
the market more difficult and costly.  
• Third, the empirical economics literature continues to show that, on average, downstream 
prices fully reflect upstream RIN costs.  This means that so long as refiners offset their RFS 
compliance obligations as they accrue them, on average, they are fully compensated for their 
RIN costs through higher wholesale gasoline and diesel prices.  
• Fourth, recent actions by the Environmental Protection Agency likely undermine RIN markets 
and may drive away market participants. This would be detrimental to market liquidity and 
inhibit price-discovery. RIN markets are designed to provide a signal about the value of 
 
 
biofuel production and distribution.  That signal becomes unreliable when EPA decisions are 
unpredictable and lack transparency.   
• Finally, details matter in any proposed changes to the Renewable Fuel Standard.  A leading 
administrative reform proposal involves capping RIN prices and waiving RVP requirements 
for E15 so that the fuel can be sold year-round.  Absent significant small refiner exemptions, 
and assuming other aspects of the RFS regulation remain the same, a D6 RIN price cap below 
$0.40/ RIN is likely to bind.  A binding price cap necessarily means that domestic ethanol 
blending will be below mandated volumes.  Nonetheless, RIN price caps could serve an 
important, stabilizing role in RIN markets, particularly if EPA continues to adjust mandate 
levels in response to high RIN prices.  However, the impacts of any reform depend critically 
on the details.  RIN price caps could make sense as part of a broader reform, but whether 
they have the intended effects on RIN markets or national biofuel use depends on whether 
and how other aspects of the program also change.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
I. The Accounting and Economic Role of RINs  
The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) was established in its current form in 2007 by the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA).  The program set ambitious long-run minimum 
volumetric domestic renewable fuel use targets for the United States transportation fuel 
industry.  The purpose of the program is to (i) enhance energy security by promoting domestic 
fuel production and reducing U.S. reliance on oil imports; (ii) support rural economies; and (iii) 
lower greenhouse gas emissions from transportation fuels. To satisfy objective (iii), the EISA 
mandates set separate volumetric targets for four biofuel categories (i) conventional renewable 
fuel; (ii) advanced biofuel; (iii) biodiesel; and (iv) cellulosic biofuel.  Each category has different 
lifecycle greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction requirements.1   
The EPA could enforce the RFS mandates in many ways.  Rather than more prescriptive means, 
the Agency uses tradeable credits to implement the mandates.  This "market-based" 
enforcement mechanism is similar to those used by other policies such as the U.S. lead 
phasedown program and the U.S. sulfur dioxide allowance trading program.  These types of 
policies leverage the insight that well-functioning markets can allocate compliance in a ‘least-
cost' way.  Under the Renewable Identification Number (RIN) system, inefficient biofuel 
producers are unlikely to be able to sustain a substantive market share.  It is because of this that 
economists have touted these enforcement mechanisms for well over 30 years as an efficient 
way to implement policies like the RFS (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2017).    
 
RINs accounting role: RIN serve first-and-foremost as an accounting system, tracking biofuel use 
throughout the United States.  Every gallon of qualifying biofuel produced in or imported into the 
United States generates a unique RIN in EPA’s Moderated Transaction System (EMTS).  RINs are 
‘attached’ to biofuels until they are blended at wholesale terminals for final consumption, after 
which they are ‘separated’ from the physical fuel and can be transferred to any party registered 
under the EMTS (Figure 1).  Different types of biofuels generate different RINs that correspond 
to the mandate categories described above.   
 
                                                          
1 Bracmort (2018) provides a more detailed description of these requirements.  
 
 
 
Figure 1- Lifecycle of a RIN.  (Source: Environmental Protection Agency) 
 
Every year, the EPA sets obligated parties' renewable volume obligations (RVOs).  Obligated 
parties are defined as under the law as U.S. oil refiners and fuel importers.  RVOs come in the 
form of percentage standards.  At the end of every compliance period, obligated parties must 
turn in a number of RINs equal to their RVO.  Only separated RINs can be turned in, or ‘retired' 
per Figure 1, for compliance.  This system ensures that only domestically blended biofuels count 
towards obligated parties' RVOs.  
EPA sets separate RVOs for each biofuel category, and these requirements are nested.  Cellulosic 
(D3) RINs can be used by obligated parties to comply with their cellulosic biofuel, advanced 
biofuel, and conventional biofuel RVOs.  Biomass-based diesel RINs (D4) count towards parties' 
biomass-based diesel, advanced biofuel, and conventional biofuel RVOs.  Advanced RINs (D5) 
count towards parties' advanced and conventional biofuel RVOs.  Conventional renewable fuel 
RINs (D6) count only towards conventional biofuel RVOs.   
Figure 2 illustrates the nesting structure. Most corn-starch ethanol generates “D6” RINs that 
count towards the conventional renewable fuel mandate.  Fuels whose lifecycle greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions are at least 50% lower than gasoline or diesel generate “D5” RINs that can count 
towards the advanced biofuel mandate.  Biomass-based diesel that achieves at least a 50% GHG 
 
 
reduction generates “D4” RINs.  Last, cellulosic biofuels that achieve a 60% or greater GHG 
reduction generates “D3” RINs.   
 
 
Figure 2- Nesting structure of RINs (Source: Environmental Protection Agency) 
 
An example may help clarify how the RVOs work.  Suppose the EPA sets a 10% total biofuel 
percentage standard; a 4% advanced biofuel standard; and a 1% cellulosic biofuel and biomass-
based diesel standard. For every one hundred gallons of gasoline or diesel sales, obligated parties 
must purchase ten RINs.  Of those, at least four RINs must be D5, D4, or D3.  Further, at least one 
of the four advanced RINs must a D3 RIN and one a D4 RIN.  The ‘undifferentiated’ six RINs can 
be D6 RINs.    
 
RINs economic importance: More important than its accounting purpose is the economic 
incentive that RINs provide for biofuel use.  Every gallon of gasoline or diesel sales creates a 
proportional RIN obligation for obligated parties, ten RINs for every one hundred gallons in the 
example above.  At the same time, every gallon of biofuel generates a RIN that can be sold.  So 
long as RIN prices are positive, this mechanism acts as an implicit tax on gasoline and diesel sales 
and a subsidy for biofuels.  As RIN prices rise, the tax and subsidy values increase.  In turn, the 
 
 
value of blending biofuels increases and fuels with higher biofuel blends become more 
attractively priced to consumers.  
Table 1 provides an example of the fuel price impacts of RINs.  The table presents prices for E0 
(100% gasoline), E10 (90% gasoline, 10% ethanol), E15 (85% gasoline, 15% ethanol), and E85 (25% 
gasoline, 75% ethanol) using wholesale gasoline and ethanol prices reported by the Nebraska 
Energy Office, but artificially varying RIN prices.  Ignore the values in parentheses for now.   
 
Table 1 – RIN price impacts on retail fuel prices 
RIN Price E0 Price E10 Price E15 Price E85 Price 
$0.00 $2.70 $2.62 $2.58 $2.10 
 ($2.70) ($2.69) ($2.69) ($2.62) 
$0.25 $2.73 $2.62 $2.57 $1.92 
 ($2.73) ($2.69) ($2.67) ($2.44) 
$0.50 $2.75 $2.62 $2.55 $1.73 
 ($2.75) ($2.69) ($2.66) ($2.26) 
$0.75 $2.78 $2.62 $2.53 $1.55 
  ($2.78) ($2.69) ($2.64) ($2.08) 
Notes: All examples use a $2.21/gal unleaded gasoline (87 octane) price and $1.40/gal 
wholesale fuel ethanol price based on average rack prices reported by the Nebraska Energy 
Office for June 2018.  All prices include a $0.184/gal federal and $0.30/gal state fuel tax. All 
examples assume a 10% biofuel mandate and that all RIN prices are equal.  Italic values in 
parentheses inflate ethanol costs to $2.10 to reflect the fuel’s lower energy content relative to 
gasoline.  Prices do not include any retail station markup. E10 prices remain the same 
regardless of RIN price because the implicit RIN tax is nearly exactly offset by the implicit RIN 
subsidy across the prices considered. (Source: Nebraska Energy Office; Author’s calculations.)  
 
E0 is the most expensive fuel in all cases due to gasoline's higher wholesale cost.  Suppose that 
total U.S. ethanol demand is not sufficiently high at a $0 RIN price to meet the RFS mandates.  As 
described in Section II, RIN prices will increase in response to this RVO deficit.  As RIN prices 
increase, fuels with higher-ethanol blends become more attractively priced.  This adjustment will 
lead to consumers who own non-flex fuel vehicles to switch from E0 to E10 and incentivize 
consumers with FFVs to switch from E10 to E15 or E85.2   
                                                          
2 Flex fuel vehicles are vehicles with engines that are capable of fueling with any ethanol-gasoline blend up to 85%.  
In 2016, it was estimated that there were as many as 20 million FFVs in the U.S., around a 7% market share. See 
https://www.afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/flexible_fuel.html.  
 
 
The table demonstrates another important impact of the RFS.  Most fuel sold today in the United 
States is E10, a 10% ethanol-gasoline blend.  As RIN prices rise, E10 prices are virtually unaffected 
because the implicit subsidy for ethanol in E10 almost entirely offsets the implicit tax on gasoline 
in E10.  For fuel with ethanol blends exceeding a 10% volume, higher RIN prices decrease retail 
prices.  Thus, most U.S. consumers are unaffected by high RIN prices at the pump, and those who 
use high-ethanol blend fuels likely benefit from high RIN prices.  The cost of the RFS mostly lies 
upstream of consumers - the mandates shift market shares from petroleum to biofuel producers.    
 
II. RIN Market Efficiency  
An efficient RIN market is critical to a successful, least-cost implementation of the RFS.   Before 
discussing the market’s performance, a digression on RIN price determinants may be useful.  
 
RIN price determinants:  In a competitive market, RIN prices are only positive if RFS mandates 
require more ethanol or biomass-based diesel use than the market would deliver in the absence 
of the mandates.  In most cases, RINs increase ethanol blending in gasoline and biomass-based 
diesel blending in diesel.  The determinants of RIN prices in these two markets are distinct, 
though the markets for RINs generated by ethanol and biomass-based diesel are linked due to 
the nesting structure of the mandates.  
There are many reasons for the fuel industry to blend ethanol in gasoline even in the absence of 
the RFS mandates, particularly given the large, industry-wide investments in blending 
infrastructure across the U.S. in the last decade.  First, ethanol is an EPA-approved fuel oxygenate.  
Oxygenate blending is required in many U.S. regions under the Clean Air Act because they reduce 
tailpipe emissions.3  Second, ethanol has a higher octane rating than gasoline. Octane is a 
measure of a fuel’s combustion resistance, and higher performance vehicles typically require 
higher-octane fuel to operate efficiently. Ethanol’s higher octane allows refiners to decrease 
octane production at the refinery, reducing costs.   
Figure 3 illustrates how RINs impact ethanol markets.  Ignore the red curve for now.  Given the 
benefits of ethanol blending, and so long as ethanol costs are competitive with gasoline, ethanol 
                                                          
3 See https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/special/pdf/mtbe.pdf.  
 
 
blending is positive even with no mandate.  Ethanol price and quantity with no mandate will be 
determined at the intersection of the fuel’s supply and demand curve.  RIN prices equal zero if 
the mandate is set at or below this level because the market needs no extra incentive to meet 
the mandate. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Ethanol demand and RIN pricing   
RIN prices are positive when the RFS requires greater ethanol consumption than the market 
would provide in the absence of the program.  In Figure 3, RIN prices are $0.10/RIN to meet the 
mandate M1 and rise sharply to $1.00/RIN if the mandate is set at M2.  The sharp decline in the 
ethanol demand curve reflects a fundamental constraint on ethanol-gasoline blending in the U.S. 
– most vehicles are only approved to use up to 10% ethanol blends.  After E10 saturate the 
conventional gasoline vehicle market, the only way to increase ethanol use is by increasing E15 
or E85 demand.  For several reasons, including limited FFV and E15/E85 fueling station capacity 
as well as FFVs consumers’ hesitancy to switch to E85, increasing E15/E85 demand requires low 
ethanol prices.  As shown in Table 1, this is achieved through higher RIN prices.  
Biomass-based diesel does not face the same blending constraints as ethanol.  It does, however, 
have higher production costs.  This is illustrated in Figure 4. In this example, the fuel industry 
demands any amount of biodiesel so long as it is price-competitive with diesel.  Because it has 
high production costs, the market demands little biodiesel in the absence of the RFS.  As biodiesel 
blending requirements increase, RIN prices rise sharply, reflecting the additional cost of supplying 
each extra gallon of biodiesel to the market. 
M1 Ethanol 
$/gal 
Ethanol Supply 
Ethanol Demand 
Ethanol Demand with E15 
$0/RIN 
M2  
$0.10/RIN 
$1.00/RIN 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Ethanol demand and RIN pricing   
 
RIN market efficiency. Fama (1970) famously defined an efficient market as one in which “prices 
always fully reflect available information.” For RINs, this requires that prices reflect all costs of 
meeting the RFS.  These costs are affected by (i) current and future mandate levels; (ii) the 
required discount that consumers need to fuel with E15 and E85; (iii) current and future gasoline, 
diesel, and biofuel prices; and (iv) current and future biofuel production costs.  All of these are 
subject to substantial uncertainty.  Just a few academic studies estimate E85 demand (Pouliot 
and Babcock, 2017; Pouliot, Liao, and Babcock, 2018), and there are no such studies of E15 
demand.  This means that little is known about the shape of the demand curve in Figure 5, 
especially as ethanol use rises above the blend wall.  Future agricultural feedstock and oil prices 
are also notoriously difficult to predict.  Last, since at least 2013, EPA rulemaking has continued 
to shift industry expectations of current and future mandates.  Figures 3 and 4 illustrate why 
shifting mandates cause volatility.  Small mandate increases, from M1 to M2 in both Figures, 
sharply increase RIN prices due to the large discounts that FFV owners require to consume fuel 
and sharply rising biodiesel production costs.   
Determining whether RIN markets are efficient is challenging. One metric is to study how quickly 
RIN prices adjust to new information.  My colleagues and I studied this in a recent peer-reviewed 
publication (Lade, Lin-Lawell, and Smith, 2018).  We found that RIN prices quickly responded to 
$1.00/RIN 
$0.10/RIN 
M1 Biodiesel 
$/gal 
Biodiesel Supply 
Biodiesel Demand 
$0/RIN 
M2  
 
 
EPA announcements shifting industry expectations of future mandates.  Figure 5 shows D6 RIN 
prices from 2012 to mid-2016 overlaid with EPA announcements.  Prices promptly increased or 
decreased depending on whether the announcement increased or reduced expected mandate 
levels. The finding is encouraging as it suggests that the market is liquid.   
 
 
Figure 5 - D6 RIN prices after the release of EPA’s (1) 2013 Final Rule, (2) 2014 Proposed Rule, (3) 2014-2016 Proposed Rule; (4) 
2014-2016 Final Rule; (5) 2017 Proposed Rule; and (6) 2017 Final Rule. (Source: Oil Price Information Service) 
 
Manipulation of RIN markets.  A related concern to market efficiency is whether there is an 
opportunity for parties to manipulate RIN prices.  The issue has been raised by several journalists, 
particularly after RIN prices increased so suddenly in 2013.4  Publicly available RIN transaction 
data are insufficient to determine whether the market has been manipulated.5  As a result, no 
academic study speaks directly to this question.  Commodity and Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) Chairman Giancarlo testified earlier this year that, using detailed RIN transaction data 
from EPA, CFTC staff were unable to find obvious manipulation in RIN markets.  However, the 
Chairman cautioned that available data was insufficient to draw definitive conclusions.6   
                                                          
4 See https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/business/wall-st-exploits-ethanol-credits-and-prices-spike.html.  
5Daily RIN prices are available through several subscription services like Oil Price Information Service, Bloomberg, 
and EcoEngineers.  EPA posts aggregate RIN generation, separation, and retirement data at  
https://www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reporting-and-compliance-help/public-data-renewable-fuel-standard.  
6 See https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/web/ag/news/business-inputs/article/2018/02/15/cftc-draw-
conclusion-rin-market-epa-2. 
 
 
Similar concerns have been raised in other tradeable credit markets.  In 2013, researchers at the 
University of California, Berkeley, University of California, Davis, and Stanford University 
considered the potential for manipulation in California’s Cap and Trade allowance program.7  The 
authors recommended that the California Air Resources Board (ARB) release timely and accurate 
data on state emissions levels as well as data on firms’ allowance holdings.  They argued that 
greater transparency makes it more difficult for firms to acquire large enough positions to 
manipulate prices.  The authors recommend that the ARB could, for example, disclose firms’ 
holdings when their net long positions exceed certain thresholds or publish the distribution of 
net-holdings of market participants.   
Similar concerns also arose in California’s market for Low Carbon Fuel Standard credits.  To 
address this, the California ARB posts quarterly histograms of parties’ net positions.8 For 
example, April 2018 data show that three firms currently hold upwards of 40% of banked LCFS 
credits.   
A few issues are worth considering when debating the speculators’ role in RIN markets.  First, as 
shown in Figure 5, much of the observed RIN market volatility can be explained by shifting signals 
from EPA.  Second, correlation does not imply causation.  The entrance of speculators into RIN 
markets when volatility increases does not mean that speculators cause price volatility.  In fact, 
volatility makes markets more attractive to speculators.  Third, speculators can serve a crucial 
role in increasing market liquidity. Last, even if a market actor were to acquire a large position in 
RIN markets, their ability to manipulate prices is limited by a key feature of RINs - biofuel 
producers can always generate more RINs by increasing production.  This would undercut efforts 
to manipulate RIN prices through withholding.   
 
III. Impacts of RINs on Downstream Market Prices  
RIN price impacts on bulk, wholesale, and retail fuel prices have been a key point of contention.  
The debate can be segmented into two questions.  First, are RIN costs reflected in wholesale 
                                                          
7 See https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/emissionsmarketassessment/informationrelease.pdf.  
8 See https://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/dashboard/dashboard.htm.  
 
 
gasoline and diesel prices? Second, do high-ethanol blend fuels (E15 and E85) reflect RIN 
subsidies?   
An important distinction is necessary on the statutory versus economic incidence of taxes.  
Statutory tax incidence lies with the party that has to pay a tax bill.  Economic incidence refers to 
the burden of the tax after market prices adjust.  For example, depending on the state, either 
fuel stations, wholesale distributors, or refiners pay state fuel taxes (Kopczuk et al., 2016).  
However, we all know that gas prices rise when fuel taxes increase.   A naïve analysis would 
suggest that consumers do not pay the tax since they do not receive a bill from the state 
government, i.e., their statutory incidence is zero.  However, the economic incidence lies almost 
entirely with consumers – upstream parties are typically fully compensated for their tax bill 
through higher prices at the pump.   
A similar distinction arises in the RIN context.  The statutory RIN tax lies with refiners and fuel 
importers – they pay the RVO ‘tax bill’ to the EPA every year.  However, whether refiners bear 
the economic burden of the tax depends on whether wholesale gasoline and diesel prices rise 
with RIN prices. Knittel, Meiselman, and Stock (2016, 2017) find that, on average, bulk petroleum 
fuel prices rise and fall one-to-one with RIN costs.9  This means that when RIN prices increase, 
wholesale gasoline and diesel prices typically increase to exactly offset refiners’ RIN costs.  So 
while the statutory incidence lies with refiners, they bear none of the economic incidence.10  
Several parties have questioned these results.  Nonetheless, EPA’s analysis agreed with Knittel, 
Meiselman, and Stock and the agency strongly argued that RIN costs are reflected in downstream 
fuel prices in its denial of petitions to change the RFS point of obligation (EPA, 2016).  
Several caveats are in order.  First, while pass-through is complete on average, it may not always 
be the case that refiners are always fully compensated for their RIN costs.  Second, the result 
holds for bulk petroleum prices.  While wholesale terminal prices closely follow bulk prices, some 
wholesale terminal prices may not fully reflect RIN costs.  Pouliot, Smith, and Stock (2017) study 
RIN pass-through at gasoline distribution terminals at 57 U.S. cities and find that pass-through 
                                                          
9 Bulk petroleum fuels considered by the authors include Gulf diesel, New York Harbor diesel, New York Harbor 
RBOB and CBOB, and Los Angeles RBOB.  Wholesale terminal prices in the U.S. are typically set in relation to these 
market prices.   
10 See Babcock, Lade, and Pouliot (2016) for more discussion on the impacts of the RFS on merchant refiners.   
 
 
varies across regions and depends on whether they study branded or unbranded prices.  Last, 
while bulk fuel prices compensate refiners for their RIN costs, RIN price volatility creates risk for 
refiners that do not purchase RINs as they accrue their RVO.  Overall, while the academic 
literature to date suggests that the economic incidence of RINs lies with downstream parties, 
more work is needed to understand how RINs affect fuel prices better.  
Table 1 illustrates the importance of the second question, whether the RIN subsidy for high-
ethanol blend fuels is reflected in consumer prices.  I assumed that this was true in Table 1 and 
my discussion in Section I.  Pass-through of the RIN subsidy is critical to increase ethanol demand, 
particularly for E15 and E85.  Market participants and the EPA questioned whether retail E85 
prices reflected the upstream RIN subsidy.  For example, the EPA included the following language 
in its proposed rule for the 2017 biofuel standards:  
 
“RIN prices can continue to provide additional subsidies that help to reduce the price of E85 
relative to E10 at retail, but the propensity for retail station owners and wholesalers to retain 
a substantial portion of the RIN value substantially reduces the effectiveness of this aspect of 
the RIN mechanism.” 
 
I studied this issue in a recently published, peer-reviewed paper (Lade and Bushnell, 
Forthcoming).  Using data from over 450 retail fuel stations in Iowa, Illinois, and Minnesota, we 
found that half to three-quarters of the RIN subsidy for E85 was passed-through to consumers, 
with even higher pass-through rates since 2015.  Complementary work supports these findings 
(Li and Stock, 2017).  This suggests that the economic mechanisms described in Section I are 
working – when RIN price increases, E15 and E85 prices decrease.   
 
IV. Small Refiner Exemptions and RIN Prices 
EISA allows the EPA to provide RVO exemptions to small refiners that would experience 
disproportionate hardships from complying with the RFS.  However, in the past exempted 
volumes were reallocated to other refiners, leaving mandate volumes unaffected.  Recent reports 
suggest that EPA granted substantially more ‘small refiner exemptions’ (SREs) in 2017 than in 
 
 
previous years, increasing SREs from 790 million RINs in 2016 to 1.46 billion RINs in 2017.11  
Further, reports suggest that at least some portion of these exemptions were not reallocated to 
larger refiners, breaking with past precedent, and that EPA issued RINs that were not generated 
by biofuel productions to some refiners to retroactively offset previous RVOs.12 
These actions have two impacts on RIN markets.  First, SREs act as a mandate cut to the RFS if 
EPA does not reallocate the exempted RVOs to larger refiners.  Second, the secrecy surrounding 
SREs undermines the integrity of RIN markets, especially if only the firms receiving the 
exemptions know of their existence.  Lack of transparency increases market participants’ 
uncertainty of mandate levels.  In the long-run, uncertainty delays investments in the very biofuel 
infrastructure that the RFS is designed to incentivize.   
 
V. RFS Reform Proposals: RIN Price Caps and RVP Waivers  
Several RFS reforms have been proposed, particularly over the last year.  I will highlight the 
potential impacts of one prominent administrative reform proposal on RIN markets - a D6 RIN 
price cap with an E15 Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP) waiver.  Lade, Pouliot, and Babcock (2018) 
provide a more in-depth discussion on this topic.  
The EPA could implement a D6 RIN price cap by offering “waiver credits” much as they do for the 
cellulosic biofuel mandate. EPA would allow parties to purchase RINs at a fixed price from the 
Agency instead of on the market. Biofuel production would not generate these waiver credits. 
Thus, biofuel use will be lower than the mandated volumes whenever obligated parties use the 
credit window.   
RIN price caps have many merits. High RIN prices since 2013 have led to extensive RFS lobbying 
by both the biofuels and oil industries. EPA has responded by adjusting the statutory mandates.  
The ensuing RIN market volatility from this approach is evident in Figure 5.  If EPA or Congress 
intend to meet legislative RFS mandates only if compliance costs are below a certain level, a RIN 
price cap is the most effective way to signal this intent to fuel markets. With a RIN price cap, 
                                                          
11 See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biofuels-epa/biofuel-groups-ask-u-s-government-to-slow-small-
refinery-waiver-program-idUSKBN1K82UL and http://biomassmagazine.com/articles/15445/epa-provides-data-on-
2016-2017-rfs-waivers-in-letter-to-grassley.  
12See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biofuels-waivers-exclusive/exclusive-epa-grants-refiners-biofuel-
credits-to-remedy-obama-era-waiver-denials-idUSKCN1IW1DW  
 
 
investors, producers, and other market participants know that they must produce and sell 
biofuels at or below the cap, reducing uncertainty caused by policy gyrations.  However, the level 
of a RIN price cap is crucial. A low cap signals to markets that only low-cost compliance options 
can be used to meet the mandates and that remaining compliance will be met through wavier 
credits purchases. A low RIN price cap also reduces the incentive to blend biofuels into motor 
fuel and increase biofuel fueling infrastructure.   
RIN prices over the last two years suggest that, absent significant SREs and other changes to the 
RFS program, a D6 RIN price cap at or below around $0.40/RIN is likely to bind.  That is, setting a 
D6 RIN price cap below $0.40/RIN will effectively reduce biofuel use below current EPA 
mandates.  A price cap below $0.20/RIN would reduce price discounts for E15 and E85, and 
decrease demand for the fuels. 
An E15 RVP waiver would allow year-round sales of the fuel.  The current lack of a waiver that 
retailers in many U.S. regions are not only allowed to sell E15 in the summertime.  This necessarily 
decreases the value of investing in E15 fueling infrastructure.  Granting a waiver would likely 
increase investment in E15 pumps, making the fuel more available across the United States.  
Figure 3 illustrates the likely effect that an E15 RVP waiver would have on RIN prices.  More E15 
stations increase demand for ethanol in the U.S., shifting the demand curve for ethanol outward.  
If this shift is large, RIN prices will decrease.  
It is difficult to determine how large of an impact an E15 waiver would have on RIN prices.  E15 
is a new fuel, and consumer uncertainty about whether E15 is appropriate to use in their vehicles 
will make them less likely to use the fuel even when it is priced competitively with E10.  E15 
pumps include warnings that the fuel is only appropriate for use in passenger vehicles 
manufactured after 2001 or in FFVs.  Further, many manufacturers include warnings to 
consumers not to use E15 in some newer vehicle models.  
Also, because ethanol has a lower energy content than gasoline, E15 needs to be priced several 
cents below E10 to be competitive.  E15 contains around 1.75% less energy per gallon than E10, 
which means consumers’ fuel economy decreases when they use the fuel.  For illustration 
purposes, I inflate the ethanol price used to calculate retail fuel prices in Table 1 to account for 
its lower energy content.  Results are in parentheses.  Ethanol blends are less attractive from this 
 
 
‘gasoline-gallon equivalent’ pricing perspective.  When RIN prices are $0.25/RIN, E15 is priced 
$0.05/gal lower than E10.  However, the discount is just $0.02 when the energy content 
differences are accounted for.  In recent work, my co-authors and I found that RIN prices below 
$0.20/gal are unlikely to provide consumers with a large enough discount to substantially 
increase demand for E15 for a wide range of gasoline and ethanol wholesale prices, especially if 
consumers require a larger price discount than the energy content value.   
All of the discussion above assumes other features of the RFS program would be unchanged.  The 
discussion is meant to demonstrate the policy trade-offs inherent in reform proposals.  
Ultimately, details matter a great deal in understanding the potential implications of any reform 
proposal.  Price caps and RVP waivers may have very different impacts on RIN costs and biofuel 
blending if other aspects of the regulation also change.13    As with other issues addressed in my 
testimony, more research is needed to understand the implications of any proposal. 
  
                                                          
13 See Stock (2018) for a detailed analysis of other RFS reform proposals.  
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